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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
law but does indicate the extent to which the Ellis rules will be applied.
It is to be hoped that any future Washington decisions in this area
will contain an analysis in terms of these rules.
JOHN F. COLGROVE
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Security Transactions - Purchase-money Mortgages, Mechanic's
Lien - Priorities. On occasion, a real estate contract vendee will have
a mechanic or materialman perform work or furnish materials prior to
the vendee's receiving record title in the property. The vendee may
also grant a purchase-money mortgage on the same property. The
purpose of this Casenote is to consider the priorities between the pur-
chase-money mortgage and the mechanic's or material-man's lien in
Washington. The matter has again been raised in the recent decision
of Nelson v. Bailey.'
The mechanic's lien attaches, at the time the work is performed, to
the interest in the land of the person who caused the work to be done.2
If the person for whom work is performed has less than the fee, the
lien will not ordinarily attach to the fee. For example, in the case of a
mechanic or materialman who performs services for a lessee who is
authorized by the terms of the lease to build, the lien attaches only
to the lessee's interest and does not attach to the lessor's fee.3 The
Washington court in the lease case rejected an argument that the
lessee was the agent of the lessor.' In the case of Newell v. Vervaeke'
used, and trusts to the judgment of the seller the selection of the article which shall be
suitable for the intended purpose, there is an implied warranty that the article furnished
shall be reasonably fit for the intended purpose. . . .But the converse of the proposi-
tion is equally the rule, namely, that when the article ordered is to be manufactured
according to certain prescribed specifications, or is an article well known and defined
in current trade, the contract is complied with when an article is furnished which is
manufactured in accordance with the designated specifications, or is an article of the
standard kind known to the trade, even though the seller may know the purposes for
which it is intended to be used and it afterwards proves to be unfit or unsitable for the
intended purpose." Id. at 605-06.
1154 Wash. Dec. 153, 333 P.2d 757 (1959).
2 RCW 60.04.030.
3 Stetson-Post Mill Co. v. Brown, 21 Wash. 619, 59 Pac. 507 (1899) ; Colby & Dick-
inson, Inc. v. Baker, 145 Wash. 584, 261 Pac. 161 (1927).
4 See note 3, supra; however, in Seattle Lighting Fixture Co. v. Broadway Cent.
Market, 156 Wash. 189, 286 Pac. 43 (1930), the court held that a mechanic's lien did
attach to the fee of the lessor in a lease which by its terms required the lessee to build.
5 189 Wash. 144, 63 P.2d 488 (1937). See also, Baker v. Sinclaire, 22 Wash. 462,
61 Pac. 170 (1900). A recorded conditional sale contract with forfeiture clause will
prevent the lien from attaching to the fee, Mentzer v. Peters, 64 Wash. 540, 33 Pac.
1078 (1893) ; Iliff v. Forssell, 7 Wash. 225, 34 Pac. 928 (1893), even if the conditional
sale contract requires that work be performed, Northwest Bridge Co. v. Tacoma Ship-
building Co., 36 Wash. 333, 78 Pac. 996 (1904).
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the Washington court held that as a general rule the work done under
orders of a contract vendee will not support a lien on property as
against the interest of the contract vendor. Upon termination of the
vendee's rights the claim of lien fails.
A purchase-money mortgage arises out of a transaction whereby
the seller conveys title to the buyer and receives back as a part of the
same transaction a mortgage to secure the balance of the purchase
price.' The general rule is that a purchase-money mortgage will
receive priority over any lien, even though it is a mechanic's lien prior
in time to the mortgage, which attached to the vendee's interest before
the vendee received title.' The priority given to the purchase-money
mortgagee, who is typically the vendor, seems fair, because the prop-
erty is brought into the vendee's hands through the financing of the
purchase-money mortgagee. In Washington a purchase-money mort-
gage will receive priority over an earlier judgment lien8 attaching by
the judgment debtor statute on after-acquired real property of the
debtor.' Thus, for some purposes the Washington court has recognized
the priority of purchase-money mortgages over prior-in-time liens at-
taching through the vendee mortgagor. It is also the general rule that
a purchase-money mortgage has priority if it is in favor of a third
person who advanced money paid to the vendor, provided the money
was loaned for that purpose only."0 The most satisfactory explanation
of the purchase-money mortgagee's receiving priority over the prior-
in-time mechanic's lien which attached to the vendee's interest before
the vendee received title, is that when the vendee obtains title he
takes only the mortgagor's estate. Thus, the mortgagor's estate is the
only equity which can be subject to liens previously created by the
vendee. The third person who advances purchase-money is said to
stand in the shoes of the vendor. 1 Another explanation is "instan-
taneous seisin," the theory of which is that title rests in the grantee
such a short time that the lien does not have time to attach. 2 This
bit of fantasy is not helpful in developing an understanding of the
problem. It does not work well in a lien theory state because under
the lien theory title remains in the mortgagor.
6 Osn0oRN, MORTGAGES § 213 (1951).
7 OsBoRNE, MORTGAGES § 213 (1951). See also, Annot., 72 A.L.R. 1516 (1931).8 Bisbee v. Carey, 17 Wash. 224, 49 Pac. 220 (1897).
0 RCW 4.56.190.10 New Jersey Bldg. & Loan & Ins. Co. v. Bachelor, 54 N.J. Eq. 600, 35 At. 745
(1896). See also, Osn0Roa, MORTGAGES § 213 (1951) ; WALSH, MORTGAGES § 38 (1934).
11 See note 10, supra.
22 Keefe v. Cropper, 196 Iowa 1179, 194 N.W. 305 (1923). See also, OSBORNE, MORT-
GAGES § 213 (1951).
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The Washington court has interpreted our mechanics' and material-
men's lien statute as creating a special problem, taking these liens
outside of the general purchase-money mortgage-lien priority rule. The
rationale of the court is that our mechanis' lien priority statute13 gives
the mechanic or materialman priority over any mortgage of which he
does not have actual or constructive notice at the time his lien attaches.
In the case of Colby & Dickinson, Inc., v. McCullock, 4 a materialman
provided materials to a contract vendee prior to the vendee's receiving
title. "Knowing" that work was in progress the mortgagee subse-
quently accepted a purchase-money and construction mortgage, which
was recorded. As a part of the same transaction the title to the prop-
erty was transferred to the vendee. The materialman prevailed over
the purchase-money as well as the construction-loan part of the
mortgage.
In the cases of Mutual Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Johnson5 and Capital
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Vaughn Hardware Co. 16 the facts were the
same as in the Colby & Dickinson case except that the purchase-money
mortgage and construction-loan mortgages were separate mortgages.
By agreement between the mortgagees, the purchase-money mortgage
was subordinate to the construction-loan mortgage. The purchase-
money mortgagee was not a party to the appeal in either case. The
materialmen's liens were held prior to both mortgage liens in each
case. In Stoneway Lumber Co. v. Lovenberg"7 the facts were the same
as in the Mutual Say. and the Capital Say. cases except that the mort-
gagee did not "know" that work was in progress when the mortgage
was accepted. In fact, the materials were delivered only a few hours
prior to the mortgage being recorded. The purchase-money mortgagee
did appeal in this case. The materialman prevailed.'
However, there are circumstances in which a materialman who
furnishes materials to a contract vendee prior to the vendee receiving
title can lose to a subsequent purchase-money mortgagee. In Hewitt
is RCW 60.04.050.
14145 Wash. 561, 261 Pac. 86 (1927).
15 153 Wash. 41, 279 Pac. 108 (1929).
16 163 Wash. 396, 1 P.2d 310 (1930).
17 156 Wash. 146, 286 Pac. 105 (1930).
18 In Dunn v. Wolf, 154 Wash. 445, 282 Pac. 842 (1929), a purchase-money mortgage
was granted when the vendee received title which was to be subordinate to a second
mortgage to be granted at a later date. The purchase-money mortgage was recorded.
The purchase-money mortgage prevailed over a subsequent mechanic's lien holder
whose lien was prior to and superior to the second mortgage because it was the intent
of the purchase-money mortgagee to be subordinate only to the second mortgage and
not to mechanics' liens.
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Lea Lumber Co. v. Sandell9 the materialman "knew" that the person
with whom he was dealing did not have title and "knew" the real
owner-vendor. The vendor purchase-money mortgagee "knew" that
work was in progress when he accepted the mortgage, but he prevailed.
The reason or this result was that the materialman did not give to the
owner or reputed owner the required notice of lien claim required by
what is now RCW 60.04.020.2" This notice by the materialman was
not required in the cases previously discussed because the materialman
was dealing with the contract vendee as owner.
The Washington court in the recent case of Nelson v. Bailey2 again
considered the purchase-money mortgage and mechanics' and material-
men's lien priority problem in a rather unusual factual pattern. In the
Nelson case a contract vendee of real property, prior to receiving title,
granted to a third party a purchase-money and construction mortgage
which was recorded. Subsequently the vendee ordered materials from
a materialman which were delivered to the property prior to the
vendee's receiving title. The materialman dealt with the vendee as
the owner of the property. The vendor then conveyed title to the
vendee. The court determined that the mortgagee was entitled to
priority because the materialman had constructive notice, through the
pre-recording of the mortgage, of the encumbrance on the vendee's
interest.2" The mechanics' and materialmen's liens have priority by
statute over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance attaching subse-
quent to the time of the commencement of furnishing materials, and
over those attaching prior to such time if not filed or recorded, if the
lien claimant had no actual notice thereof.2" In Nelson the court said
that notice under "our mechanics' lien statute,"24 either actual or con-
structive, is the important factor in determining priorities and that
title is not a significant consideration. The court did not consider the
fact that after the vendee receives title his interest is different, being
greater than the interest to which the liens originally attached. If
19 66 Wash. 515, 119 Pac. 848 (1912).
20 RCW 60.04.020 applies only to material men and not to mechanics.
21 154 Wash. Dec. 153, 333 P.2d 757 (1959).
22 In recognizing the validity of the pre-recording of a real property mortgage, the
court apparently considered the real property recording statute, RCW 65.08.070, and
the after-acquired title statute, RCW 64.04.070. In the Nelson opinion, RCW 64.04.060,
which states that the use of the word "heirs" is not necessary to convey a fee simple
title, was cited, undoubtedly due to a printing error.
2s RCW 60.04.050.
24154 Wash. Dec. 153, 159, 338 P.2d 757, 761 (1959).
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notice is to control priority, we must know what notice is and to
whom it must be given.
The court distinguished the Mutual Say., Capital Say., and Stone-
way Lumber Co. cases from the Nelson case on two grounds. The first
distinction was that the mortgages were recorded after the work com-
menced while in Nelson the mortgage was recorded prior to the work
commencing. This distinction would only affect constructive notice
to the materialman or mechanic, in the absence of actual notice, and
certainly would not determine whether or not the mortgagee had notice
that the work was in progress. The second distinguishing factor, the
court said, was that in each of the cases the mortgagee "knew" that
the work was in progress when the mortgage was taken. This distinc-
tion is questionable, since under the Stoneway Lumber Co. decision
the purchase-money mortgagee who did not "know" that the work
had commenced was subordinated to a materialman who delivered
materials a few hours prior to the recording of the mortgage. The
second distinction can be justified only if we treat the commencement
of work by the mechanic or materialman as constructive notice to the
mortgagee of the prior lien on the vendee's interest. The use of the
words "knew" and "know" in the decisions is ambiguous and does not
help in determining what constitutes notice.
The court held in all the above decisions that notice controls the
priorities between a mortgagee and a mechanic's lien holder who per-
formed work for a contract vendee. This seems to reject the tradi-
tional purchase-money mortgage priority theory. 5 Apparently the
commencement of work by the materialman or mechanic will be con-
structive notice to the mortgagee whether or not he "knows" work has
commenced. The only way that a purchase-money mortgagee is going
to prevail over a mechanic's lien acquired by performing work for a
contract vendee, short of actual notice, is to pre-record the mortgage
prior to the deed to the vendee and prior to the commencement of
work by the mechanic. In this respect Washington law is unique. The
mortgagee has the additional possibility of prevailing over the material-
man as indicated above in the Hewitt Lea Lumber Co. case. With
notice being the sole criteria of determining priority it seems possible
that any mortgagee, not just a purchase-money mortgagee, who follows
the above procedure would prevail over a mechanic's or materialman's
25 Cases from other jurisdictions which follow the general purchase-money mortgage
priority doctrine were cited in the Nelson case, but the court apparently did not follow
the reasoning of these cases.
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lien holder. Draftsmen of purchase-money mortgages in Washington
should be extremely thorough in determining whether or not there are
in fact prior mechanics' or matterialmen's liens against the interest of
the "reputed" owner-mortgagor. YANCEY RESER
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Statutory Construction-Retroactivity of Legislation-Workman's
Compensation Act-Host-Guest statute. In Hammack v. Monroe St.
Lumber Co.1 the Washington court held that the 1957 legislative act'
amending Washington's Workman's Compensation Act' and abolish-
ing the immunity proviso contained therein would not be construed
retroactively.
Appellant (plaintiff in trial court) was injured in a traffic accident
due to the negligent operation of a truck driven by respondent's em-
ployee. The appellant sued for both personal injuries and property
damage. As both parties were in the course of extrahazardous employ-
ment as defined by the act, the trial court dismissed the action. The
dismissal was based on the immunity proviso which was then in effect:
"[N]o action may be brought against any employer or any workman
under this act as a third person if at the time of the accident such em-
ployer or such workman was in the course of any extrahazardous
employment under this act."'
Upon appeal,5 the supreme court reversed in part, holding that the
immunity extended only to actions for personal injury and not to an
action for property damage. The case was remanded for further find-
ings to determine what had been the final disposition of the appellant's
claim for compensation under the act.'
The case was pending in superior court on remand on the effective
date of the repealing statute.' Appellant then claimed that the re-
spondent was no longer entitled to the defense provided by the statu-
tory immunity, but the trial court held that the immunity proviso was
1154 Wash. Dec. 217, 339 P.2d 684 (1959).
2 Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 70 § 23.
8 RCW title 51.
4 Wash. Sess. Laws 1929, c. 132 § 1.
5 Hammack v. Monroe St Lumber Co., 49 Wn.2d 581, 303 P.2d 1095 (1956).
6 The court's theory was that a rejection of the claim on the ground that the work-
man was not in the course of his employment would be res judicata in a subsequent
action against the employer. Young v. Department of Labor & Indus., 200 Wash. 138,
93 P.2d 337 (1949) ; Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4, 84 P.2d 397 (1938).
7 Technically, the 1957 act was an amendment which simply dropped the immunity
provision and not a direct repealing act.
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